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ARTICLES
STEPPING THROUGH GRUTTER'S OPEN DOORS: WHAT
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CASES MEAN FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT
DECISIONMAKING
Helen Norton*
In Grutter v. Bollingert and Gratz v. Bollinger,2 the Supreme Court added to the
very short list of interests considered sufficiently compelling to justify government's
race-based decisionmaking.3 In these decisions, a majority of the Court identified a
"forward-looking" 4 or "instrumental" 5 justification as compelling-specifically, the
University of Michigan's interest in attaining a diverse student body to achieve a range
. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. Stanford University; J.D.,
Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I am grateful to Elise Boddie, Kelly Dermody,
Jocelyn Frye, Tom Perez, Judith Winston, Claudia Withers, and the participants in a University of Maryland
School of Law faculty workshop for their insightful comments, and to Jason S. Whitehead and William H.
George for their excellent research assistance. Special thanks, too, to the University of Maryland School of
Law for its financial support for this research.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. Gritter, 539 U.S. at 325 (finding a law school's goal of achieving diverse student body sufficiently
compelling to justify race-based decisionmaking).
4. Justice Stevens has referred to diversity-based rationales as "forward-looking" because they describe
strategies to capture the benefits of racial diversity to society now and in the future. Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646-47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1986) (characterizing
employers' affirmative action programs intended "less to purge their past than to build their future" as
"forward-looking").
5. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New
Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REv. 677 (2004) (discussing certain affirmative action programs
as "instrumentally rational strateg[ies] used to achieve the positive effects of racial and gender diversity in
modem society"). Throughout this Article, I use the terms "forward-looking" and "instrumental"
interchangeably.
TEMPLE LAW RE VIEW
of educational benefits. 6  In so holding, the Court-for the first time in years7-
expanded, rather than narrowed, the circumstances under which governmental
affirmative action programs could be upheld.
Before the University of Michigan cases, the Supreme Court had significantly
restricted such programs in several ways. Perhaps most important, the Court had
insisted that all race-based government actions were equally suspicious, regardless of
their motive, and were thus subject to the same rigorous strict scrutiny.8 Despite our
nation's historically asymmetrical treatment of race, whereby people of color-and not
whites-have experienced race-based disadvantage, the majority has consistently
rejected the suggestion that "[t]here is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination." 9
Moreover, before Gratz and Grutter, a majority had recognized only a narrow
range of "remedial" or "moral" justifications ° for affirmative action as sufficiently
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. Years earlier, Justice Powell had found higher educational institutions' goal
of achieving a diverse student body to be compelling when he provided a fifth vote both for invalidating the
UC-Davis Medical School's racial set-aside program and for reversing the state court's injunction forbidding
the school from considering race in any way. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313-15, 320
(1978). For more than two decades, public universities and other government entities modeled their programs
on Justice Powell's views. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (citing amici briefs that noted that admissions
programs at law schools, colleges, and universities employ methods based on Powell's opinion in Bakke). But
not until the University of Michigan decisions did a majority adopt as the Court's holding his conclusion that
universities have a compelling interest in a diverse student body. Id. at 325.
7. The Court had last upheld an affirmative action program in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990). Holding that the federal government's "benign" use of race-based classifications need satisfy only
intermediate scrutiny, the Court upheld the FCC's minority ownership enhancement as substantially related to
achieving government's important interest in broadcast diversity. Metro Broadcasting was overruled a few
years later in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all governmental race-
based action-both benign and invidious-must satisfy strict scrutiny).
8. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion). As Derrick Bell has written, "[Tihe Court now treats all race-conscious efforts to eradicate racial
inequality as conceptually equivalent to acts designed to install racial hierarchy." Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2005).
9. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens. J., dissenting); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been
extirpated.").
10. Remedial rationales are often also described as "moral" justifications for affirmative action because
they seek to remedy ongoing racial injustice stemming from slavery, segregation, and other forms of
discrimination. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "'Diversity is Good for
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004) (discussing the shift in the justifications for affirmative action from
morality-based arguments to economic arguments); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board
Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L.
REv. 795, 839-53 (2005) (distinguishing "moral" or "remedial" from "business" or "instrumental" rationales
for diversity); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 690 (2004) (noting reasoning frequently used by conservative
opponents of affirmative action to support a societal obligation to remedy effects of past racial injustice).
Kathleen Sullivan has also referred to remedial rationales as "backward-looking," because they require courts
to look backwards to assess past discrimination and its continuing effects. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 82.
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compelling to survive strict scrutiny. For example, the Court repeatedly rejected the
government's asserted interest in addressing societal discrimination, maintaining that
the remedies for such discrimination are potentially limitless and thus impose unfair
burdens on nonminorities:
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this
country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that
work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over
expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their
ability to affect the future. I I
Focusing solely on those potential drawbacks, the Court failed to consider any
benefits-to persons of color specifically or to the nation generally-that might derive
from governmental efforts to tackle such discrimination.'
2
The Court instead accepted as compelling only an interest in correcting
government's own past discrimination1 3  or specifically-identified private
discrimination within that government's particular jurisdiction.14 Moreover, the Court
declined to defer to the government's judgment as to the continuing effects of such
racial wrongs, instead demanding very specific evidence for believing that present ills
are in fact attributable to identified past injustice.
15
As courts applied these exacting standards to reject governments' proffered
remedial justifications, many advocates of affirmative action turned to instrumental
rationales to support race-conscious government decisionmaking. 16 This strategy,
however, was not uncontroversial even among the programs' supporters, as a number
Throughout this Article, I use the terms "remedial," "moral," and "backward-looking" interchangeably.
11. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also Croson, 488
U.S. at 505 ("To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for
rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief for every
disadvantaged group.").
12. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (asserting that past discrimination alone is not enough to warrant a race-
based remedy); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (1978) (asserting that helping members of certain groups perceived to
be victims of societal discrimination "does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions
program are thought to have suffered"); Seth Harris, Innocence and the Sopranos, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577,
608 (2004) ("The Supreme Court has never explained why serving the interests of 'innocents' is 'compelling,'
while serving the interests of the victims of societal discrimination, or even society's interest in eliminating the
vestiges of societal discrimination, is not.").
13. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (1986) (plurality opinion).
14. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92 (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 493-94, 507-08 (requiring government to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that race-conscious action was necessary to remedy ongoing effects of past discrimination).
16. See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 5, at 678-79 (discussing reasons for the legal shift to a more
instrumental and forward-looking approach to defending affirmative action); Monique C. Lillard et al., The
Effect of the University of Michigan Cases on Affirmative Action in Employment: Proceedings of the 2004
Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination Law, Labor
Relations and Employment Law, and Minority Groups, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 127, 146 (2004)
(explaining that diversity is not a "defensive formulation for an affirmative action plan, but is a positive
statement"); Wilkins, supra note 10, at 1569 (discussing the ABA's program to increase the number of
minority lawyers by stimulating demand for their work at large law firms).
20051
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of thoughtful commentators questioned whether a focus on forward-looking rationales
signaled a retreat from articulating the moral justification for affirmative action.
Derrick Bell, for example, argued that diversity-based rationales are "a serious
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice" because they, among other
things, enable "courts and policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race
and class that adversely affect so many applicants." 17
The Supreme Court joined this debate in Gratz and Grutter, where the University
of Michigan did not offer 18-and the Court did not assess-any remedial defense of its
affirmative action programs. Instead, a majority for the first time identified a forward-
looking justification as compelling-specifically, a public law school's interest in
attaining a diverse student body that contributes to a range of educational benefits, such
as promoting cross-racial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, enlivening
classroom discussion, and preparing students for an increasingly diverse society. 19
Taking care to "dispel the notion" that "remedying past discrimination is the only
permissible justification for race-based government action," 20 Grutter recognized the
value of diversity in higher education in terms that leave open the possibility that the
Court might also find other forward-looking justifications compelling. This Article
explores the extent to which Grutter and Gratz have thus changed the Court's equal
protection landscape in ways that may be relevant to other governmental decisions and
decisionmakers. More specifically, this Article tests Grutter's observation that
"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based government action under the Equal
Protection Clause."
2 1
Part I examines a decisionmaking context very similar to that presented in the
University of Michigan cases: race-based financial aid decisions by public institutions
of higher education. It observes that Grutter opens many doors for race-based
scholarships, while closing some others. First, it suggests that the Court's embrace of
forward-looking rationales may enable governments to rely on more generalized-and
thus more relaxed-factual predicates to justify race-based decisionmaking motivated
by instrumental concerns.2" Second, instrumental justifications may also help reshape
courts' understanding of undue burden to include an assessment of diversity's
countervailing benefits, again increasing the possibility that an affirmative action
program will survive strict scrutiny.
17. Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622 (2003); see also Frymer &
Skrentny, supra note 5, at 681 (characterizing instrumental rationales as "ignoring historical discrimination
and in turn, ignoring structural power differences"); Daria Roithmayr, Tracking Left: A Radical Critique of
Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 220 (2004) ("[l]t is important that we not abandon the more expansive
view of racial justice in the quest to preserve the limited remedy of affirmative action.").
18. See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2000), reversed in part by 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(noting that unlike the Defendant-Interveners-who included minority students who applied or intended to
apply for admission to the University-the Defendant University itself never invoked a remedial basis for its
admissions programs).
19. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
20. Id. at 328.
21. Id. at 327.
22. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Grutter seems to have relaxed
the required factual predicate for race-conscious admissions programs designed to further diversity.
[Vol. 78
STEPPING THROUGH GRUTTER'S OPEN DOORS
Part I concludes that schools can establish the requisite strong basis in evidence
for concluding that race-conscious scholarships further their compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body. It further observes that race-conscious financial aid
decisions that adhere to the sort of "whole file" approach endorsed in Grutter almost
certainly pass strict scrutiny. 23  It predicts, however, that many race-exclusive
scholarships face substantial-but not necessarily insurmountable-barriers to a
finding of narrow tailoring.
24
Part II pushes farther afield to examine a very different set of choices by a
different set of government decisionmakers: public entities' employment decisions.
25
Here, too, Grutter opens new doors to race-based decisionmaking, some more
promising than others.
This Part concludes that forward-looking rationales may well extend to the
employment context, although their application may be limited and occasionally
dangerous. 26  For example, justifications for affirmative action that rely on race and
national origin as proxies for other attributes that can and should be measured more
directly--e.g., skill in managing a diverse workforce or anticipating the needs of a
diverse consumer base-are themselves steeped in the sort of discriminatory
stereotypes that remedial rationales seek to challenge.
Particularly intriguing, on the other hand, is the rationale suggested in an amicus
brief filed in Grutter by a variety of retired military leaders and cited by the Court with
apparent approval. 27 Under this approach, race-conscious employment decisions may
be justified when a diverse leadership team visibly communicates a rejection of racial
caste systems that otherwise undermine a public entity's legitimacy-and thus its
effectiveness.
This rationale demonstrates how racial diversity can be instrumentally valuable
precisely because it is morally justified: government entities that challenge racial castes
are not only acting morally, but also more effectively by engaging the trust,
cooperation, and commitment of a racially diverse community. The Article concludes
by urging policymakers, advocates, and courts to identify with precision the
justifications offered to support government's race-based decisionmaking, taking care
to parse permissible race-conscious action that challenges racial scripts from
decisionmaking that reinforces such stereotypes.
28
23. See infra note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole file" approach as analyzed in
Grutter.
24. See, e.g, United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding remedial court decree requiring
fifty percent of Alabama state police promotions to go to African Americans until approximately twenty-five
percent of rank was comprised of African American troopers). See also infra notes 103-05 and accompanying
text for examples of a permissible narrowly tailored, race-exclusive approach.
25. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's acknowledgement of
the benefits of a diverse workforce in Grutter.
26. See infra notes 207-16 for a discussion of the limits of instrumental rationales for affirmative action
in the employment context.
27. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (citing amici curiae brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., stating
the need for a racially diverse military as support for maintaining racial diversity in other selective U.S.
institutions).
28. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text for this Article's conclusion.
2005]
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I. CLOSE TO (GRUTTER'S) HOME: RACE-CONSCIOUS FINANCIAL AID DECISIONS
We start our look a+ equal protection's new terrain with a question close to that
raised in the University of Michigan cases: what are the implications of Grutter and
Gratz for race-conscious financial aid strategies to achieve public educational
institutions' compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body? No consensus
response has yet emerged. Shortly after the Michigan decisions, a number of schools
dropped or modified their use of race-targeted scholarships, 29 while others declined to
make any changes despite complaints by affirmative action opponents.30
Schools struggle with these choices with almost no judicial guidance. Podberesky
v. Kirwan31 remains the only decision to date addressing an equal protection challenge
to race-conscious financial aid.32 The University of Maryland defended its race-
exclusive scholarships solely on remedial grounds, only to see them struck down by the
Fourth Circuit.33 How, if at all, does the newly-recognized availability of forward-
looking justifications change this landscape?
A. Race-Based Scholarships as a Means to Achieve the Educational Benefits of a
Diverse Student Body: The Required Factual Predicate
34
Courts evaluating backward-looking rationales for race-based decisionmaking
have required a very "strong basis in evidence" for the government's conclusion that
29. See Daniel Golden, New Ways to Define Diversity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that
Williams College, Indiana University, Carnegie-Mellon, "and other schools have opened their minority
scholarships to all races"); Susan Thomson, Schools Revamp Restrictive Scholarships, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2004, at Al (reporting that St. Louis University and the University of Missouri at
Columbia eliminated or changed their minority scholarship programs in response to Gratz and Grutter).
30. See Golden, supra note 29, at A l (describing Seton Hall Law School's defense of its race-conscious
scholarship program despite an investigation by the Office of Civil Rights); Peter Schmidt, Bucking A Trend,
U. of Wisconsin System Will Defend Race-Based Student Aid Program, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 13,
2005 (describing University of Wisconsin's plan to defend its race-targeted scholarships under investigation by
the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights); Peter Schmidt, Not Just for Minority Students Anymore,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 2004, at A 17 (reporting that Pepperdine and Washington University had
decided to retain their scholarships available only to African American students despite complaints by the
Center for Equal Opportunity); see also Peter Schmidt, Affirmative Action Remains a Minefield, Mostly
Unmapped, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 24, 2003, at A22 (reporting that the American Civil Rights
Institute and the Center for Equal Opportunity "have contacted dozens of colleges and threatened to file federal
complaints if the institutions did not open ... programs up to members of any race"). Still other schools are
likely wrestling with these decisions as well, as a 1994 survey by the General Accounting Office found that
most institutions of higher education offered some form of race-conscious scholarships. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITY-TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS, 1994 WL
810016, at *4 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE] (concluding that nearly two-thirds of
all undergraduate institutions, one-third of all graduate schools, and almost three-fourths of all professional
schools offer at least one minority-targeted scholarship).
31. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) [Podberesky 11], vacating, 838 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993) [Podberesky
f].
32. PodbereskyH, 38 F.3d at 152.
33. Id. at 161.
34. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (describing the "factual predicate"
requirement under strict scrutiny for affirmative action programs).
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remedial action was indeed justified.35  In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 36 and
Podberesky, for example, the courts demanded that the government prove both that the
contemporary problem it sought to remedy was in fact the result of past discrimination
within that government entity's jurisdiction and that the problem was sufficiently
serious to warrant a race-based solution.
37
Courts have generally applied this evidentiary requirement to block the
government's remedial defense of its affirmative action programs, even when the
history of race-based discrimination is clear.38  In Podberesky, for example, the
University of Maryland had excluded African-Americans entirely until 1951 and
resisted desegregation for many years thereafter.39 Yet the Fourth Circuit insisted that
neither the University's poor present-day reputation in the African-American
community nor the perception that the campus remained hostile to African-Americans
could be attributed to the University's past discrimination. 40  The panel rejected the
University's proffered factual predicate in part because the school could not show that
the perception of on-campus racial hostility at Maryland varied from that at schools
that did not have a history of segregation, even though those northern comparator
schools carried their own history of race discrimination.
41
Similarly, in Croson, the Supreme Court demanded that Richmond offer more
than "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire
industry" in defense of a minority contracting program, rejecting the city's reliance on
congressional findings of nationwide discrimination in construction and insisting
instead on evidence specific to Richmond's construction industry. 42  The Court
maintained that the city had failed to establish any past discrimination against minority
contractors within its jurisdiction, much less that discrimination explained why
35. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08.
36. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
37. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (noting that the history of public and private discrimination standing
alone cannot justify a rigid racial quota); Podberesky 11, 38 F.3d at 153 ("To have a present effect of past
discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party seeking to implement the program must, at a
minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and that the effect is of
sufficient magnitude to justify the program.").
38. These barriers, though challenging, are not insurmountable. For example, the Tenth Circuit found
that the federal government had established a factual predicate sufficient to establish its compelling interest in
remedying the effects of past discrimination in highway contracting. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater
(Adarand VII), 228 F.3d 1147, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Mineta, 532 U.S. 967, cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 534 U.S. 103 (2001); see also Concrete Works
of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 992 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding Denver's
affirmative action contracting ordinance as adequately supported by evidence of past discrimination in the
construction industry).
39. Podberesky 1, 838 F. Supp. at 1077-81.
40. Podberesky 11, 38 F.3d at 153-55.
41. Id. at 154-55; but see Podberesky I, 838 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (noting that northern schools--even
though never officially segregated-had also engaged in past discrimination that carried continuing effects).
42. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 ("[The g]eneralized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks
to remedy."); but see id. at 529, 541 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Richmond's city council had




minority contractors received less than one percent of city contracts even though
African-Americans made up approximately half of Richmond's population.43
But Grutter suggests that the factual predicate needed to support instrumental
justifications may be relaxed compared to that required for remedial rationales. 44 In
Grutter, the Court accepted generalized evidence that diversity is educationally
beneficial rather than insisting that the school offer evidence specific to the University
of Michigan. For example, the Court credited expert reports and other studies
concluding that diversity "promotes learning outcomes" and prepares students for
participating in a diverse workforce. 45  It found that these conclusions were further
"bolstered" by a variety of amicus briefs submitted by employers and military leaders
detailing their assessment of the benefits of education in a racially diverse
environment. 46  Reviewing this evidence, the Court specifically concluded that the
educational benefits of diversity-identified to include promoting cross-racial
understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, enlivening classroom discussion, and
preparing students for an increasingly diverse society-are "not theoretical but real,"
and "substantial .
47
What might explain the Court's apparent willingness to accept a broader range of
evidence in support of forward-looking, rather than backward-looking, rationales for
affirmative action? Note that instrumental justifications do not require the specific
finding of past discrimination that has so transfixed the Court in remedial contexts.
Free from its narrow focus on determining institutional guilt by identifying specific
incidents of wrongdoing to be remedied, the Court may feel more open to acknowledge
that other institutions and other settings offer relevant evidence as to the benefits of
diversity.
48
43. Id. at 498-506.
44. See JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 18 (2003) [hereinafter JOINT
STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS] (discussing Grutter evidentiary requirements). The
Scholars found:
Unlike the Court's compelling interest requirement in remedial cases, where there must be a 'strong
basis in evidence' to document an institution's compelling interest in remedying the present effects
of its past discrimination, there was no comparable evidentiary requirement imposed by the Gruter
Court. The Court did, however, reference a body of evidence supporting the benefits of diversity,
contained in both the trial record and in the briefs of amici curiae; thus, one can expect that at least
some quantum of evidence will be needed to support a holding that a non-remedial interest is
compelling, even if the burden of producing a 'strong basis in evidence' is not imposed.
Id.
45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
46. Id. at 330-31.
47. Id. at 330.
48. Grutter's acceptance of a relaxed factual predicate might also be explained by the Court's general
willingness to "defer" to universities' educational judgments. See id. at 328 ("The Law School's educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."); see also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1977) (plurality) (noting First Amendment support for
university's educational autonomy that includes freedom to select its student body). But the Court did not
simply defer to the University's judgment that diversity is educationally beneficial: the majority found that the
University's conclusion was "substantiated" and that diversity's educational value is "substantial" and "not
theoretical but real." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328, 330.
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In any event, once the Court recognized the educational benefits of a diverse
student body as compelling, the link between that end and the school's chosen means-
considering race in admissions decisions-became clear.49 Admitting a diverse group
of students is, of course, a necessary step to actually attaining a diverse student body.
The link between financial aid decisions and student body diversity should be
equally apparent. A student body's ultimate composition depends on the makeup of
several overlapping but distinct groups: those who apply, those who are admitted, those
who enroll, and those who stay and graduate. 50 Not surprisingly, the more generous the
financial aid package offered, the more likely that a student will accept a school's offer
of admission. 51 The type of aid, as well as the amount, matters. Students are "nearly
twice as likely to go to a school that offers them a merit scholarship as a school that
offers the same amount in needs-based aid."5 2 Thus, once a school has identified its
pool of admittees, its financial aid offers influence the admittees' decisions about
whether to enroll (and, once enrolled, whether to stay).
Financial aid incentives in this way present an important tool to higher
educational institutions seeking a diverse student body as they compete for a relatively
small pool of minority students.5 3 The yield rate (the likelihood that a candidate
offered admission by a school will actually enroll there) differs significantly for
comparably qualified white and black admittees; the average spread between black and
white yields varies from eleven to fourteen percent.5 4  The higher the candidate's
qualifications, the greater this spread. 55 Race-conscious financial aid incentives thus
49. Id. at 330 (recognizing benefits such as breaking down racial stereotypes and enlivening class
discussion).
50. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59
Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994) (finding that financial aid for minorities serves as a recruitment tool for schools
and also encourages those students who are offered admission to enroll); JOINT STATEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, supra note 44, at 21 ("Financial aid and support programs can be especially
important because they can help ensure that a diverse student body is actually enrolled and is maintained
during the academic year, and not just admitted.").
51. Andrew Braunstein et al., Measuring the Impact of Income and Financial Aid Offers on College
Enrollment Decisions, 40 RES. IN HIGHER EDuc. 247, 248 (1999) (concluding that "[a]ll forms of financial aid
(i.e., grants, loans, and work study) positively impact enrollment"); see also Geier v. Sundquist, 128 F. Supp.
2d 519, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) ("One of the most important determinants for the majority of student
enrollment decisions is the receipt of financial aid.").
52. Kim Clark, Decision Time, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 2004, at 53 (citing 2003 Harvard
study).
53. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 33-34 (1998) (finding that highly qualified
black students are often admitted by more schools than white applicants and thus have more options from
which to choose); Dennis J. Shields, A View from the Files: Law School Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51
DRAKE L. REV. 731, 741-42 (2003).
54. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 53, at 34 n.18.
55. Id. fig.2.9; see also Shields, supra note 53, at 742 (discussing law student yield). Shields states:
Here is what law schools know about yield. The stronger the academic profile of the applicant,
based on the LSAT and cumulative academic average of a candidate, the less likely he or she will
accept an offer of admission. This is because such candidates are admitted to several other peer
institutions, thus have other excellent options and many ultimately decide to go to law school
elsewhere.
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increase the prospects of a diverse student body by encouraging students of color to
accept offers of admission.
56
Moreover, school administrators also believe that race-targeted financial aid helps
recruit and retain students of color by sending an especially tangible example of the
school's commitment to diversity.57  Administrators further report that, when
successful, such strategies carry a spill-over effect: the more minorities a school
successfully encourages to enroll, the more attractive that school becomes to still other
prospective minority students as critical mass increases and the possibility of isolation
lessens.
5 8
This use of financial aid to attract students of color is entirely consistent with an
emphasis on merit-based aid. A school's assessment of a candidate's merit hinges on
his or her ability to help the school achieve its educational mission.59 The University
of Michigan, for example, identified its mission as "'producing classes both diverse and
academically outstanding, classes made up of students who promise to continue the
tradition of outstanding contribution by Michigan Graduates to the legal profession.'
60
56. See Dave Gershman, Minority Scholarships to Face Legal Critique, ANN ARBOR NEWS, June 22,
2004 (describing surveys by the University of Michigan finding that the "vast majority" of minorities reported
that financial aid was "very important" or "the primary reason" for their decision to attend the University); but
see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV.
367, 477 (2004) (finding a decline in aid to African Americans likely to have little affect on yield). Sander
states:
It is certainly possible that a decline in aid for blacks, if it occurs, could discourage some black
applicants. On the other hand, Hispanic law students currently receive far less scholarship aid than
blacks (even though Hispanic law students tend to come from less affluent backgrounds) but apply
to law school in very similar proportions to their numbers among college graduates.
Id.
57. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Supra note 30, at *7 (finding that financial aid helps to
establish "a critical mass of minority enrollment and send[s] a message that the schools sincerely want to
attract such students"). Moreover, financial aid may be an especially important tool for schools located in
areas with relatively few minorities that may face additional challenges in attracting students of color. See,
e.g., Rachel Spector, Note, Minority Scholarships: A New Battle in the War on Affirmative Action, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 307, 340 (1991) (examining the difficulty in attracting minorities to the University of Iowa). Spector
notes:
In order to attract an adequate percentage of minority students in a state with only a four percent
minority population, the University of Iowa must target students from outside the state. Because
out-of-state students incur higher living expenses and pay higher tuition rates, they require more
money to finance their education .... Because the population in Iowa is overwhelmingly white,
minority students may be discouraged from attending the University of Iowa because they fear a
racially hostile environment.
Id.
58. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at *7.
59. See ARTHUR L. COLEMAN ET AL., FEDERAL LAW AND FINANCIAL AID: A FRAMEWORK FOR
DIVERSITY-RELATED PROGRAMS 5 (2005) (describing goals of financial aid to include "helping colleges and
universities promote their core missions by enrolling students who can best help institutions achieve their
educational goals").
60. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-22 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.)
(referring to Harvard's admissions policy, in which Harvard states that if "scholarly excellence" were the sole
or primary measure of merit, Harvard "would lose a great deal of its vitality and intellectual excellence and
that the quality of the educational experience offered to all students would suffer") (quoting FINAL REPORT OF
W. J. BENDER, CHAIRMAN OF THE ADMISSION AND SCHOLARSHIP COMMITTEE AND DEAN OF ADMISSIONS AND
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To accomplish this mission, the University sought to admit individuals with
"'substantial promise for success in law school' ... 'a strong likelihood of succeeding
in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of others"' and
"'varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other."' 61
Schools evaluate candidates' merit based on their potential for contributing to these
goals, and make scholarship decisions-like admissions decisions-that reflect that
appraisal. A more attractive financial aid package thus increases the likelihood that a
meritorious student-e.g., a student who can help achieve the school's mission by,
among other things, contributing to the racial diversity that engenders a range of
valuable educational benefits-will accept an admission offer.
B. Race-Based Scholarships as a Means to Achieve the Educational Benefits of a
Diverse Student Body: The Narrow Tailoring Requirement
Once the factual predicate for race-based financial aid as a means to achieving a
diverse student body is established, the question for schools seeking to adopt these
strategies then becomes not whether, but how to consider race in their decisions.
62
More specifically, do race-exclusive scholarships available only to students of color
remain viable after Grutter and Gratz, as opposed to race-conscious financial aid
decisions that consider race as one of several measures of diversity?
Recall that the Court's narrow tailoring analysis in Gratz and Grutter assessed
Michigan's compliance with five requirements. First, race-based quotas for admissions
are prohibited.63 Second, each candidate must receive an individualized review of his
or her qualifications, including an assessment of his or her ability to contribute to the
school's interest in diversity. 64 Third, the school must consider, but not necessarily
exhaust, race-neutral alternatives. 65 Fourth, the program must not impose an undue
burden on nonminorities. 66 Finally, the program must be limited in time.
67
Shifting majorities of the Court applied these standards to uphold the law school's
admissions program 68 while invalidating the undergraduate program, 69 despite
F[NANCIAL AID (1960)).
61. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 313-14 (quoting Grutter's petition for certiorari).
62. Of course, many critics object to race-targeted scholarships on policy, as well as legal grounds, and
thus would counsel schools to forego race-conscious scholarships even absent any legal questions. See, e.g.,
Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 759, 790-
93 (1995) (objecting to race-based scholarships as "impel[ling] minority students to attend universities where
the academic standards exceed their capabilities" and fostering feelings of resentment by white students).
63. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (holding that a race based admission program cannot constitutionally use a
quota system).
64. Id. at 336-37 (finding that individual evaluation is a vital characteristic of a constitutional race-based
admission program).
65. Id. at 339 (requiring good faith consideration, but not necessarily exhaustion, of race-neutral
alternatives).
66. Id. at 341 (requiring race-conscious admissions to "not unduly harm members of any racial group").
67. Id. at 341-42 (requiring race-based admissions to have "a logical end point").
68. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious
admission program was narrowly tailored and thus not prohibited by the equal protection clause).
69. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (holding that the University of Michigan's race-based undergraduate
admission policy was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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considerable skepticism as to whether the two were different in any legally significant
manner. 70 Indeed, only Justice O'Connor 7t and apparently Justice Breyer 72 found them
distinguishable; the other seven justices would have either sustained both programs or
struck them both down.
But schools attempting to navigate these shoals can cling to a couple of possible
distinctions for safety. First, Justice O'Connor was especially disturbed that the
undergraduate program automatically conferred a bonus-quantified as twenty points
when one-hundred points guaranteed admission-to all members of underrepresented
groups.73 In contrast, the law school's program did not automatically award a plus
factor to every member of an underrepresented group.74  Second, the twenty points
awarded to applicants of color under the undergraduate program were apparently
outcome-determinative, because all minority candidates with a certain minimum range
of qualifications were admitted. 75  However, the law school's plus factor was not
always outcome-determinative because nonminority applicants were sometimes
admitted over minority applicants who had higher grades and test scores.
76
The law school's successful "whole file" approach to diversity in admissions
appears readily transferable to financial aid decisions. This approach requires an
individualized review that includes consideration of each candidate's potential
contribution to the school's diversity objectives in a way that values measures of
diversity in addition to race and national origin-e.g., age, employment history, and
other life experiences.
77
70. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634,
1634 (2003) (expressing doubt as to whether the programs can be distinguished on a principled basis); Wendy
Parker, The Legal Cost of the "Split Double Header" of Gratz and Grutter, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 596
(2003) ("The most obvious open question is distinguishing between what makes the undergraduate system
unconstitutional and the law school program constitutional."); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 248 (2004) ("There is no constitutionally significant difference between the
Grutter and Gratz programs.").
71. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 56, at 391 (pointing out that only Justice O'Connor found the difference
between the two programs to be legally significant).
72. Justice Breyer joined in Gratz's judgment striking down the undergraduate program, but not the
majority opinion. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281-82. He joined Grutter's majority upholding the law school's
program. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
73. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Lillard et al., supra note 16, at 129
(unlike Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, the law school engaged in "individualized, quite non-
standardized, quite subjective, and very non-quantitative" decisionmaking); Robert C. Post, Foreword.-
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (2003) (hypothesizing
that fixed point values for race in undergraduate admissions process "sends a message" encouraging members
of racial minorities to feel entitled to a set bonus).
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
75. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272.
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341; see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding as narrowly tailored the law school's consideration of a variety of forms of diversity that resulted in
the admission of "whites scoring at or below every index score level from which minorities were admitted").
77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (stating that the law school considers each candidate's ability to
contribute to the diversity of the school through his or her own unique characteristics and experiences).
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Because Grutter makes clear that schools need not exhaust race-neutral
alternatives before engaging in race-conscious action, 78 schools need not first resort to
purely needs-based scholarships in their efforts to achieve student body diversity, as
class-based approaches have already proven ineffective in achieving a racially diverse
student body.7 9 For these reasons, many schools now consider race when assessing
candidates for certain merit-based financial aid.80
Given that race-conscious financial aid policies adopting a "whole file" approach
appear readily defensible, why might some schools prefer to retain race-exclusive
scholarships to achieve a racially diverse student body?8' What does race-exclusivity
add, other than increased litigation risk?
First, race-exclusive scholarships may be even more effective than race-conscious
scholarships in communicating to prospective students of color the school's
commitment to racial diversity and thus may be more successful in encouraging a
racially diverse yield of enrolled students. 82 Second, race-exclusive scholarships may
be easier to implement than "whole file" reviews because they may not require the time
and resources necessary to evaluate all of the possible ways each individual may
contribute to the school's diversity.8 3 Finally, private donors-who provide a sizable
portion of scholarship funds-may place race-based restrictions on their gifts, thus
creating a pool of student aid that would not necessarily exist unless available only for
race-exclusive purposes.
84
78. See id. at 339 (finding that narrow tailoring requires good faith consideration, but not necessarily
exhaustion, of race-neutral alternatives).
79. As William Bowen and Derek Bok point out: "While blacks and other minorities are much more
likely than whites to come from poor families, they still make up a minority of all college-age Americans with
low incomes." BOWEN & BOK, supra note 53, at 47, 50-51 ("[T]he problem is not that poor but qualified
candidates go undiscovered, but that there are simply very few of these candidates in the first place.");
Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 471 (1997)
(concluding that class-based affirmative action is unlikely to achieve meaningful levels of racial diversity in
educational institutions); Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at
Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2248 (2000) (concluding that Boalt's class-based admissions program
primarily benefited whites and Asian Americans and "did little to boost the representation of Blacks and
Latinos"); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472,
473 (1997) (reporting that "UCLA's class-based preferences had only mixed success in preserving racial
diversity at the law school[,]" with the enrollment of African Americans and American Indians dropping by
more than seventy percent from the levels achieved under race-based affirmative action).
80. See Thomson, supra note 29 (reporting that St. Louis University replaced its race-exclusive
scholarship with a Martin Luther King scholarship available to students who demonstrate the potential for
promoting Dr. King's dream of a "diverse but unified" America).
81. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at *29 (reporting that a number of school
administrators stated that they believed race-exclusive scholarships to be more effective in achieving their
diversity goals than race-conscious programs).
82. Id. at *34 (reporting that some school leaders believe that race-exclusive scholarships add credibility
to their stated commitment to diversity).
83. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (describing University of Michigan's undergraduate school's contention
that the law school's "whole file" approach was too burdensome to implement when assessing larger numbers
of applicants); Spann, supra note 70, at 226 (suggesting that "the Court's insistence on holistic considerations
of admissions files may increase the administrative burden imposed on admissions offices enough to reduce
the amount of affirmative action that schools can afford to undertake").
84. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at *5 (concluding that nearly three-fifths of
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Are any of these justifications-alone or in combination-likely to enable race-
exclusive scholarships to survive narrow tailoring analysis?
On one hand, race-exclusive scholarships may run afoul of Grutter's ban on
quotas. Grutter defined an impermissible quota as "a program in which a certain fixed
number or proportion of opportunities are 'reserved exclusively for certain minority
groups.' ' 85 Race-exclusive scholarships intended to achieve a diverse student body
may be characterized as quotas because they represent some percentage of scholarship
money that is reserved for students of color.
The response, of course, points out that race-exclusive scholarships generally
represent a small proportion of total scholarship money, most of which is available to
white students as well: if the amount of race-conscious aid "represents only a fraction
of the total aid available to all students," then any burden on nonminorities may be seen
as too "small and diffuse" to frustrate equal protection principles.86 The General
Accounting Office's 1994 survey found that race-targeted scholarships comprised only
about five percent of all undergraduate and graduate school scholarships and
scholarship dollars.8 7  Race-conscious scholarships represented a somewhat larger
proportion of grants at professional schools: fourteen percent of professional school
scholarship dollars-including nearly one-third of all scholarship dollars at public law
schools-were race-targeted.88
But recall that the Court struck down the University of California at Davis'
reservation of sixteen medical school seats for minorities even though Allen Bakke and
other white applicants could still compete for the great majority (eighty-four percent) of
all slots. 89 Similarly, in Croson, the Court invalidated Richmond's set-aside for
minority contractors even though white contractors could still compete for the bulk
(seventy percent) of city contracts. 90 Automatically excluding nonminorities from
consideration for a specific opportunity-even if many other opportunities remain open
to them-seems to be the equal protection injury that most troubles the Court.9 1
Schools may also argue that funds distributed pursuant to private donors' race-
based preferences should not run afoul of narrow tailoring analysis because those funds
might not be available unless reserved for race-exclusive purposes. 92 For state action
minority-targeted scholarships at undergraduate schools are funded by private endowments); Ryan O'Quinn,
Pepperdine Maintains Has Right to Offer Minority Scholarship, Malibu Times, Jan. 28, 2004 (describing
privately funded scholarships at Pepperdine where donors insisted on race-exclusivity).
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 496).
86. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 48; see also Spector, supra note 57, at 330 ("Minority
scholarship programs do not unduly harm nonminorities because they do not bar them from attending college
or university. Many alternative financial aid programs exist which are not restricted to minority students.").
87. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at *7.
88. Id. at *17.
89. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (finding that the University did not meet its burden of showing that its race-
based admissions program was narrowly tailored).
90. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
91. See id. at 493-95 (discussing the Court's objection to programs that "deny certain citizens the
opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race").
92. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59
Fed. Reg. 8756, 8763 (Feb. 23, 1994) (suggesting that some private donors wish to support only race-exclusive
scholarships and thus add to the total pool of financial aid that would otherwise be available).
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purposes, however, donors' race-based restrictions may well be attributed to a public
school that administers the privately-funded grant, thus triggering the same strict
scrutiny accorded any governmental action based on race.93 Even absent a finding of
state action, race-based grants administered by private donors are subject to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and its prohibition on racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts; indeed, in Gratz the Court found that Michigan's undergraduate admissions
program violated section 1981, as well as Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.
94
Race-exclusive scholarships designed to facilitate student body diversity may also
be vulnerable under narrow tailoring analysis because they do not allow for
individualized consideration of every admitted student: some candidates are not eligible
to be considered for certain scholarships because of their race. Again, the fundamental
equal protection offense identified by the Court appears to be the race-based exclusion
from consideration for any significant opportunity.
95
But whether an opportunity is "significant" for these purposes is not always clear.
On one hand, almost any amount of scholarship money might be considered a
significant opportunity, because the difference between a grant and a loan-let alone
the difference between aid and no aid-may affect an individual's decision about
whether and where to attend school. 96 Post-graduation career choices and other life
decisions may similarly be affected by a student's debt load. 97
On the other hand, the opportunity to tap into a particular scholarship fund can be
distinguished from the opportunity to attend a particular school. As the U.S.
Department of Education concluded, unlike admissions decisions, "[t]he use of race-
targeted financial aid ...does not, in and of itself, dictate that a student would be
foreclosed from attending a college solely on the basis of race."98 Indeed, the courts
93. See Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (finding state agency that
denied black applicants' admission to a school pursuant to private donor's race-based restriction engaged in
state action prohibited by equal protection clause); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1327
(N.H. 1990) (public school's participation in administering trusts that discriminated on the basis of religion
and gender constituted impermissible state action); but see B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential Treatnent:
The Varying Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1391, 1394 (2001) (advocating that public universities should be able to administer privately-funded
scholarships that include race-exclusive restrictions without triggering state action analysis).
94. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
95. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("The denial to respondent of this right to
individualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions
program.").
96. JOINT STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS, supra note 44, at 22 (noting that
"[slcholarships and other forms of financial aid ...may determine whether an individual can attend the
university.").
97. See Clark, supra note 52, at 53 (describing student decisions to attend certain undergraduate schools
based on whether they could graduate debt-free and thus be in a better position to then choose to attend
graduate school); Kennedy, supra note 62, at 790 (discussing the impact of finite scholarship resources on
student admissions); but see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 915-16 (1995)
(concluding that potential salary, rather than debt load, is a primary factor influencing law students' career
decisions).
98. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8756, 8762 (Feb. 23, 1994); see also Spector, supra note 57, at 328 (distinguishing race-based financial
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have recognized that not all opportunities are equally significant-and not all burdens
thus equally undue-for equal protection purposes. The Supreme Court, for example,
noted that adverse hiring decisions inflict lesser burdens than do lay-offs, explaining
that such hiring decisions "impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities." 99 Similarly, the First Circuit found that the denial of a transfer
within a school district is "markedly different from the denial of a spot at a unique or
selective educational institution;" this "diminished" burden contributed to the panel's
willingness to find that the district's race-based transfer plan was narrowly tailored. 100
Grutter's embrace of an instrumental rationale for affirmative action may add a
new wrinkle to this debate. Because forward-looking justifications acknowledge the
benefits, as well as any costs, of racial diversity, they may temper the role of "undue
burden" as a barrier to a finding of narrow tailoring. Recall that in holding that race-
based solutions to societal discrimination unacceptably burdened innocent
nonminorities, the Court failed to consider any countervailing benefits from the
government's commitment to remedial racial justice, nor did it attempt to assess the
costs of failing to address societal discrimination. 10 1 But the instrumental rationale
recognized in Grutter may create opportunities for addressing this omission by
embracing diversity's educational value to all-white students as well as students of
color. Whether any burden borne by whites is undue should thus only be assessed after
balancing race-conscious decisionmaking's gains as well as its costs. While a white
student may experience some disadvantage if unable to compete for a race-exclusive
scholarship, that burden may be outweighed by the benefits-to students of all races as
well as the government institution and thus society at large-of attending an institution
that delivers a more valuable educational experience precisely because of the increased
racial diversity facilitated by such scholarships. 1
02
aid programs as having only minimal adverse consequences for nonminorities as compared to race-based
admissions decisions that may deny matriculation altogether).
99. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing how
the denial of a future employment opportunity is less of a burden than losing one's current job).
100. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 2005 WL 1404464, at *16 (1st Cir. June 16, 2005) (en banc).
101. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for discussion of the Supreme Court's previous focus on
burden of remedial programs.
102. See, e.g., Brief for Sixty-Five Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5-7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for Sixty-Five Leading American Businesses] (explaining that
success in today's increasingly diverse economy requires education in a racially diverse environment); Sanford
J. Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 575 (2000) (noting white students suffer harm by attending a
nondiverse institution). Although this argument presents opportunities for affirmative action programs'
successful defense, Derrick Bell has written forcefully of the dangers of what he calls "Interest-Convergence,"
where courts uphold affirmative action plans "that minimize[] the importance of race while offering maximum
protection to whites and those aspects of society with which [the Court] identifies," cautioning that "blacks and
Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of a ruling motivated by other interests [e.g., the interests of elites
like employers, schools, and the military, rather than the interests of people of color] that can and likely will
change when different priorities assert themselves." Bell, Diversity's Distractions, supra note 17, at 1625; see
also Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 CoLtUM. L. REV. 1610, 1615-16
(2003) (finding irony in arguments supporting affirmative action on grounds that racial diversity contributes to
leaming because they suggest "that admitting blacks is good because it helps whites").
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In sum, Grutter expands some avenues for race-conscious financial aid strategies,
while narrowing others. In particular, governments may rely on more generalized
factual predicates to support forward-looking rationales for race-conscious
decisionmaking. An embrace of instrumental justifications may also help reshape the
courts' understanding of undue burden to include an assessment of diversity's
countervailing benefits, again increasing the possibility that affirmative action
programs can survive strict scrutiny.
And while schools can confidently implement a "whole file" approach to race-
conscious financial aid, those defending race-exclusive approaches face formidable
obstacles in showing that such approaches are narrowly tailored in a particular context.
These barriers are not necessarily insurmountable, however, as is the case with race-
exclusive remedies for government's own discrimination. 10 3 Virginia, for example,
recently authorized a new scholarship program available to students who were locked
out of public schools during the state's "massive resistance" campaign against
desegregation in the 1950s and 1960s when it chose to close four public school systems
rather than integrate them. 104 When such discrimination targets African-Americans
exclusively, equally race-exclusive remedies are appropriate.0 5
Race-exclusive approaches may also remain necessary to achieve other
compelling objectives, such as capturing the educational benefits of students' reduced
racial isolation and increased interracial contact. The First Circuit recognized this
possibility when it upheld a school district's transfer policy driven largely by "the
requesting student's race and the racial makeup of the transferor and transferee
schools."' 1 6  Because the policy sought to reduce the burdens suffered by students
experiencing racial isolation, the en banc panel found that the benefits of racial
integration could be achieved only by relying on race in voluntary student transfer
requests. 107
Similarly, race-exclusive scholarships may provide the only means for achieving
any meaningful measure of racial diversity for schools facing unusual challenges in
attracting students of color, especially small institutions and/or institutions in
communities with few minorities.' 08 The Department of Education's Office of Civil
103. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (upholding as permissible under
the equal protection clause a remedial court decree requiring fifty percent of Alabama state police promotions
to go to African Americans until approximately twenty-five percent of rank was comprised of African
American troopers); Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the Struggle
Against Racial Oppression, 62 UMKC L. REv. 651, 661 (1994) (arguing that minority-targeted scholarships
are a small but important step towards remedying racial discrimination).
104. Sandhya Somashekhar, Va. Scholarships Aim to Atone for Abuses During Desegregation, WASH.
POST, June 21, 2005, at A3.
105. Although motivated by animus against African Americans, Virginia's actions also disadvantaged
some white students who were locked out of their local public schools as a result of the racially-motivated
closures. Id. Thus, the scholarship program as proposed would apparently also be available to white
Virginians who moved or dropped out when their local public schools were closed. Id.
106. Comfort, 2005 WL 1404464, at *6.
107. Seeid. at*16-17.
108. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 57, at 340 (arguing that because the University of Iowa must recruit
students from other states in order to achieve sizeable minority enrollment, the school must provide financial
assistance to minority students to attract them to a school where they will pay higher out-of-state tuition and
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Rights ("OCR") recognized this in its 1997 resolution of a Title VI complaint,
concluding that Florida Atlantic University's scholarships targeted exclusively to
African-Americans were narrowly tailored to achieve its interest in a diverse student
body.10 9 While OCR advised the University that race-conscious (rather than race-
exclusive) measures rested on even stronger legal grounds, I 10 it found that the school's
targeted scholarships were justified in light of evidence that earlier non-race-exclusive
efforts had proved effective in recruiting white, Latino, and Asian/Pacific Islander
students, but less successful in recruiting black students."l' To be sure, schools should
tread especially carefully when considering race-exclusive scholarships in light of the
Court's clear preference for an "inclusive" understanding of diversity.
II. FARTHER AFIELD: RACE-CONSCIOUS EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
Next, what does Grutter's acceptance of a forward-looking justification mean for
other government decisionmakers' ability to consider race when making very different
decisions? The Ninth Circuit found Grutter's extension from university admissions to
high school assignment decisions an easy reach: "We simply do not see how the
government's interest in providing for diverse interactions among 18 year-old high
school seniors is substantially less compelling than ensuring such interactions among
18 year-old college freshmen." 12 The First Circuit reached the same conclusion in
upholding a school district's race-conscious transfer policy," 3 when it found the
compelling educational benefits of a racially diverse student body to include not only
"breaking down racial barriers, promoting cross-racial understanding, and preparing
students" for a racially diverse society, but also reducing students' racial isolation that
may impose "psychological burdens that can lead to poor attendance and academic
woes."114
But Grutter noted the benefits of diversity outside the educational context as well:
"American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."' 1 5 The Court's acknowledgment of employers'
interest in a workforce educated in a racially diverse environment suggests that the
decision may carry implications for government employment decisions. 116
To be sure, the employers' briefs in the University of Michigan cases focused
primarily on their need for workers educated in a racially diverse environment, and
may "fear a racially hostile environment").
109. Letter from U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Region IV, to Dr. Anthony J. Catanese,
President, Fla. Atlantic Univ. (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with author) (regarding resolution of complaint #04-90-
2067).
110. Id. at 1.
I11. Id. at 4 & n.6.
112. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2004).
113. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 2005 WL 1404464, at *1, *18 (1st Cir. June 16, 2005) (en banc).
114. Id. at *12.
115. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 406, 330 (2003).
116. See, e.g., id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the Grutter majority's rationale
for diversity was so broad as to support its extension to employment, as well as educational, decisions).
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thus better prepared for a racially diverse workplace and society., 7 But some went
further, also asserting an interest in a workforce that is itself racially diverse. 18  A
variety of instrumental rationales have been offered in support of this distinct interest,
some promising and others troubling.
A. Rationales for Racially Diverse Workforces: Improved Problem-Solving
The justification most commonly proffered for a racially diverse workforce
simply mirrors that made by schools: just as the exchange of viewpoints in an
educational setting is enriched by diverse perspectives, so too is the circulation of ideas
in the workplace. Just as the Grutter Court was persuaded that diversity fosters
classroom discussion that "is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting,""' 9 diversity may similarly enhance workplace dialogue and debate.
Indeed, a growing body of evidence indicates that racially diverse groups make better
decisions than racially homogenous groups because they are informed by a greater
array of perspectives. 12 0
This rationale may resonate most powerfully for employers that prefer decisions
fully informed by a free flow of perspectives to decisions made quickly and efficiently.
While heterogeneous groups may be more creative, some evidence suggests that they
may also experience conflict, tension, and greater transition costs as diverse individuals
take time to build comfort with each other.' 2' Perhaps this particular justification is
thus most persuasive when articulated by employers that can show that they truly value
117. Brief for Sixty-Five Leading American Businesses, supra note 102, at 2, 7 (arguing in support of
diversity in higher education as crucial preparatory exposure that increases likelihood of students' workplace
success); Brief for General Motors Corporation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516)
[hereinafter Brief for General Motors] (arguing that only a workforce educated in a racially diverse
environment can "maintain America's competitiveness" in an increasingly diverse and interconnected world
economy); but see Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzchild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial Preferences and
Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT 3, 5 n.9 (2004) (arguing that corporate support for affirmative action
"should carry little or no weight," because corporations are simply responding to activists' pressure, advancing
personal rather than business agendas, and/or attempting to undermine smaller employers).
118. E.g., Brief for General Motors, supra note 117, at 23-24 (citing numerous benefits to corporations
"of having a significant number of people of color and varying ethnicities in their upper ranks").
119. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (internal quotations omitted).
120. See Brief for General Motors, supra note 117, at 24 (surveying evidence that "heterogeneous work
teams create better and more innovative products and ideas than homogenous teams," which tend to suffer
from "group think"); Fairfax; supra note 10, at 832 (concluding that "both the quality of their [heterogeneous
groups'] analysis and the quality of their ultimate decision are likely to be superior to homogeneous groups").
121. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 834 (describing studies concluding that "diverse groups not only
experience more communication problems, but also tend to report higher levels of anxiety and frustration with
their workgroup"). Of course, educational diversity may ameliorate this dynamic by helping students develop
the ability to build trust and comfort with a wide range of people in advance of their entry into a diverse
workplace. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (citing reports and studies highlighting the advantages of diversity
in promoting "learning outcomes" and better preparing students for the workforce); Brief for General Motors,
supra note 117, at 12-13, 15-16 (stating that diverse educational institutions provide great opportunities for
students to acquire the skills necessary to perform major tasks in the workplace).
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exchanges enhanced by diverse perspectives' 2 2-as is likely the case, for example, for
a public university's faculty hiring decisions. 1
23
B. Rationales for Racially Diverse Workforces: Race-Matching2 4 Workers to
Customers and/or Co- Workers
Many also contend that a racially diverse workforce (distinct from a workforce
educated in a racially diverse environment) is valuable because it ensures the
availability of minorities who are seen as necessary to appeal to or work with a racially
diverse consumer base or workforce.12 5 Under this rationale, for example, an employer
would be justified in hiring Latinos based on its belief that Latino customers are more
comfortable with fellow Latinos and/or that Latino workers better understand the tastes
of a Latino consumer base.
However benignly-motivated, this rationale invites a return to long-discredited
"customer preference" defenses where employers sought to justify discriminatory
choices as necessary to accommodate the prejudiced tastes of others. 126 As Cass
Sunstein has observed, market pressures like customer preference "do not check
discrimination but instead increase the likelihood that it will continue. ' 127 Indeed, this
approach only indulges the sort of stereotypes that antidiscrimination principles seek to
counter-i.e., stereotypes that members of the same race belong together, work better
122. See Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. I,
84 (2000) (commenting that diverse perspectives are less likely to enhance work product in "jobs that
primarily involve the application of technical skills or physical abilities"); Lillard et al., supra note 16, at 132
(suggesting that this rationale might be limited to employment settings structured for the free exchange of
ideas); Wilkins, supra note 10, at 1587-89 (suggesting that law firms and other employers do not necessarily
welcome diverse or challenging opinions).
123. The judiciary may offer another example of an institution that thrives on diverse approaches and
perspectives. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 410-11 (2000) (maintaining that racial diversity improves judicial
decisionmaking by including traditionally excluded perspectives and ensuring that judicial decisions are not
dominated by a single set of approaches); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach
to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 26 (2005) (suggesting that racial
diversity improves judges' decision-making processes as they interact with colleagues in chambers and on
appellate panels).
124. See Wilkins, supra note 10, at 1594-96 (describing employers' "race-matching" strategies).
125. See, e.g., Brief for Sixty-Five Leading American Businesses, supra note 102, at 7 (asserting that
racially diverse, culturally aware managers are desirable and effective representatives for national and
international businesses); BOWEN & BOK, supra note 53, at 12 ("[A] diverse corporate leadership can be
valuable both to understand the markets in which many companies sell and to recruit, manage, and motivate
the workforce on which corporate performance ultimately depends.").
126. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 474 (1 Ith Cir. 1999) (finding that private
employer's race-matched assignment of black telemarketers to black homes was based on a racial stereotype
and could not be considered an "affirmative action" exception under Title VII); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,
653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting private employer's claim that its refusal to promote female
plaintiff was justified under Title VII because of its belief that its Latin American customers would not do
business with a woman); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1971)
(rejecting, under Title VII, private employer's attempt to justify its policy of hiring only women as flight
attendants based on customer surveys showing that passengers preferred female flight attendants).
127. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2415 (1994); see also Frymer &
Skrentny, supra note 5, at 712-13 (discussing various employers' discriminatory race-matching strategies).
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together, and are "especially good at certain tasks."' 128  As David Wilkins has
explained, this rationale thus invites tracking or steering workers of color into narrowly
defined roles-for example, in law finns where lawyers of color may be typecast for
certain assignments (such as employment defense litigation, municipal bond practice,
or service on their firms' "diversity committees") regardless of their interests or
expertise. 1
29
Moreover, this particular defense of diversity invites parallel race-matching when
the relevant consumer base or workforce is predominantly white. Recently, for
example, Abercrombie and Fitch settled a large class action lawsuit 30 where the
plaintiffs alleged that Abercrombie expressly preferred whites and rejected minority job
applicants pursuant to its requirement that employees exhibit the "A&F Look," a
"virtually all-white image that Abercrombie uses not only to market its clothing, but
also to implement its discriminatory employment policies."'' Similarly, a suburban
Philadelphia hospital assigned only white health care personnel to a female patient after
her husband requested that no African-American employees assist in her delivery,
32
and African-American drivers alleged that UPS assigned them to less desirable routes
in minority neighborhoods based on their race.'
33
Racial equality requires that employers screen directly for the skill they purport to
seek in individual applicants-e.g., the ability to manage diverse groups or the ability
to anticipate the needs of a diverse consumer base-rather than assume race to be an
acceptable proxy' 34 for these talents and skills. 13  Relying on such proxies engenders
128. See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 5, at 722 (noting the potential benefits and burdens of
instrumental affirmative action).
129. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 1594-96; see also Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 5, at 708-13 (noting
that stereotyping job roles on account of race perpetuates employers' racial perceptions and impedes minorities
from competing for certain jobs).
130. Jenny Strasburg, Abercrombie to Pay $50 Million in Bias Suits, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 2004, at C 1.
13 1. Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, No. 03-
2817 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2004).
132. Philadelphia Hospital Apologizes for Racial Incident, JET, Oct. 20, 2003, at 16.
133. Anastasia Hendrix & Zachary Coile, Blacks Charge Racial Bias at UPS, S.F. EXAMINER, May 1,
1997, at A6.
134. Deborah Hellman has described "proxy" discrimination as that where race or sex "is used as a
proxy for another trait," while "non-proxy" discrimination values race and/or sex in and of themselves, rather
than as "stand-ins" for other traits. Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REv. 315, 316 (1998). For example, she would characterize President Clinton's interest
in a Cabinet that "looks like America" as an example of proxy classification if he sought to use race as a screen
for diversity of viewpoint and/or experience; she would characterize such a goal as a non-proxy classification
if instead Clinton sought racial diversity to "promote the appearance of inclusiveness, an important goal for the
President to seek." Id. at 321.
135. See Estlund, supra note 122, at 83 (arguing that for more individualized employment decisions, it is
more possible and sensible "to make individualized inquiries into the actual experiences and attitudes of the
applicant, rather than to use the proxy of racial identification"); Sunstein, supra note 127, at 2416 (describing
race and gender as "so highly visible and thus so cheaply used as [proxies] for other things. Different
characteristics-for example, educational attainment-might be more accurate as proxies but less efficient to
use because the cost of gaining accurate information is higher."); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978) (Powell, J.) (rejecting medical school's asserted interest in race-based admissions to
increase the number of doctors committed to serving underrepresented communities as unsubstantiated and
suggesting that schools could more effectively identify those likely to serve disadvantaged communities by
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workplace separation and exclusion by pigeonholing persons of color into narrowly
defined roles while insulating certain attractive job opportunities for white
candidates.1 36  Moreover, race can be a poor indicator of such qualities, not only
thwarting equal opportunity, but also grooming candidates for failure and undermining
the employer's ultimate goals.1
37
Such race-matching not only facilitates consciously discriminatory decisions, it
also reinforces unconscious bias, as revealed by a developing body of cognitive
psychology literature that sheds further light on the power of stereotypes. According to
this research, individuals of all races often unconsciously use stereotypes as cognitive
short-cuts to make sense of an information-laden world by placing newly-encountered
items into previously-created categories with ascribed meanings. 13 Just as we put
foods encountered in the grocery store aisle into mental categories, like "fruit,"
"vegetable," and "meat"-attaching meaning to those categorizations that affect our
decisions about what and how much to buy-so too do we automatically sort people
into categories, including racial categories linked to meanings that often shape our
interactions with those individuals. For example, one study reported that resumes
randomly assigned with white-signaling names (like "Emily" or "Greg") generated
higher callback rates from employers than equally qualified resumes with assigned
African-American-signaling names (like "Jamal" or "Lakisha"). 139 Another study
found that video game players of all races who "were instructed to decide as quickly as
possible whether to shoot" a given target "were more likely to mistake a Black target as
armed when he in fact was unarmed" and "to mistake a White target as unarmed when
he in fact was armed."' 40 Similarly, computer users exposed to subliminal flashes of a
black face before a computer crash responded to the crash with greater hostility than
assessing applicants' demonstrated commitment and interest).
136. Sunstein, supra note 127, at 2416.
137. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities
Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1647 (2004) (questioning whether minorities are
well-positioned to groom other minorities for corporate success: "The types of racial minorities most likely to
succeed may not be the ones most likely to perform door-opening activities for other minorities."); Hellman,
supra note 134, at 322-23 (describing how the factual predicate for such generalizations may be inaccurate,
thus excluding non-minorities who possess the desired trait while including minorities who do not).
138. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (1995) (describing stereotypes as "well-learned internal
associations about social groups that are governed by automatic cognitive processes"); Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory. 77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1103, 1110-11 (2004) (describing cognitive short cuts and their behavioral and legal consequences);
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005) (summarizing recent social
cognition research and concluding that most persons automatically sort other persons into racial categories and
assign racial scripts to those categories).
139. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 2-3 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Econ.
Working Paper Series, No. 03-22, 2003); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content o Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1165
(1995) (suggesting that many discriminatory employment decisions result not from conscious prejudice, but
from unconscious judgments that are common features of cognitive categorization functions).
140. See Kang, supra note 138, at 1493 (summarizing Joshua Correll's social cognition study).
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did users to whom white faces had been subliminally flashed.14 ' Using race as a proxy
for characteristics that reinforce pre-existing racial scripts only encourages such
implicit bias and its attendant behavioral consequences.
Paul Frymer and John Skrentny have expressed concern that Grutter invites a
troubling reliance on customer preference and related race-matching rationales.
142
Although I share their discomfort with these particular justifications for affirmative
action, I read Grutter as taking care to avoid them. While the opinion cited with
approval employers' contention that they need a workforce educated in a racially
diverse environment, 43 the Court did not adopt arguments suggesting that employers
also need a racially diverse workforce to match the race of clients or colleagues. This
omission is perhaps not surprising, given the Court's earlier rejection of a race-
matching "role model" rationale'" for affirmative action in part because it might also
be used to justify discrimination against historically excluded groups:
[B]ecause the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to
the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be
used to escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the small
percentage of black teachers by reference to the small percentage of black
students. Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are
better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court
rejected in Brown .... 145
Instead, Grutter suggested yet another possible rationale for diversity as valuable
in and of itself-rather than as a proxy for some other quality-when it cited with
apparent approval the conclusion that the military "must train and educate a highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse educational setting."'
146
141. See id. at 1491 (summarizing John Bargh's social cognition study).
142. See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 5, at 680-82 (suggesting that the shift to instrumental rationales
for affirmative action has distracted from America's unique historical and social-political justifications for
affirmative action and instead focuses on race in uncritical biological terms).
143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
144. In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 277 (1986) (plurality) (Powell, J.), a school
board defended its race-conscious teacher layoffs as motivated by its interest "in providing minority role
models for its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination," as well as by
its interest in remedying its own past discrimination. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 277.
145. Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The goal
of providing 'role models' discussed by the courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty."). Although Justice O'Connor did not explain her understanding
of the difference between the two rationales, the "role model" rationale apparently contends that black students
will benefit from the presence of same-race teachers. Id. at 274. In contrast, the "faculty diversity" rationale
appears to mirror the "student body diversity" rationale accepted in Grutter. With that understanding, a
"faculty diversity" rationale does not promote race-matching but instead suggests that the faculty-and/or the
student body-as a whole will benefit from the exchange of diverse perspectives that is enhanced by racial
diversity.
146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
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C. Rationales for Racially Diverse Workplaces: Enhancing Institutional Legitimacy
and Effectiveness
A group of high-ranking retired military officers and civilian leaders filed a brief
in the University of Michigan cases that described their experiences from the 1960s and
1970s, when "an overwhelmingly white officer corps" commanded racially diverse
enlisted ranks.' 47 The brief characterized this dynamic as creating racial tensions so
great as to "undermine[] military effectiveness,"' 148 triggering pervasive perceptions of
discrimination, lack of trust, low morale, heightened racial polarization and tension,
widespread disciplinary problems, and racially motivated incidents.' 49  The leaders
asserted that, "[b]ased on our decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principal
mission to provide national security."'
150
The military leaders concluded that "[t]he absence of minority officers seriously
threatened the military's ability to function effectively and fulfill its mission to defend
the nation," leaving it "on the verge of self-destruction."' 5  They identified the
underlying cause of these tensions as follows:
In the 1960s and 1970s, the stark disparity between the racial composition of
the rank and file and that of the officer corps fueled a breakdown of order
that endangered the military's ability to fulfill its mission. That threat was so
dangerous and unacceptable that it resulted in immediate and dramatic
changes intended to restore minority enlisted ranks' confidence in the
fairness and integrity of the institution. In a highly diverse society, the
public, including minority citizens, must have confidence in the integrity of
public institutions, particularly those educational institutions that provide the
training, education and status necessary to achieve prosperity and power in
America.1
52
But why, more precisely, did this dynamic play out so as to undermine the
military's effectiveness? The brief explained that African-American enlisted personnel
who observed no African-Americans in leadership positions concluded that the military
had no respect for African-American contributions nor any commitment to African-
Americans' successful military careers, and thus lost confidence in the military as an
institution. 153 The further, unstated, premise seems to be that an all-white leadership
presiding over a racially diverse community will be seen as mirroring the race-based
master-servant dynamic too often played out in this country. 154 A racially diverse staff
may thus be less likely to trust and work with a leadership that appears to be
147. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius Becton et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 146, at
14.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius Becton et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 146, at
28-29.
153. Id. at 16, n.5.
154. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing lingering effects of discrimination as "reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended").
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maintaining a racial caste system, 155 thus frustrating that leadership's effectiveness.
Grutter itself noted the link between visible diversity and effective, legitimate
government:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members
of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. 
15 6
"Legitimacy" in this context may be understood as the belief "that an authority is the
appropriate decision maker and should have discretionary power to make decisions for
a community."' 157 Jack Balkin has similarly described legitimacy in this context as
including "sociological legitimacy - whether people believe that the system is
sufficiently fair and just that they can support it."1t 58 Legitimacy thus measures
individuals' trust in leaders' authority and their willingness to comply with those
leaders' directives. 59 Under these terms, the more legitimate a government institution,
the more trust and cooperation it engenders, and thus the more effective it becomes. 1 60
For this reason, a racially diverse leadership team may more effectively manage a
racially diverse workforce than an all-white leadership corps-not because it is
necessarily composed of more talented or experienced managers but because the team's
visible diversity communicates a rejection of the racial caste systems that undermine
institutional legitimacy.
161
Moreover, repeating patterns that mirror a history of racial caste-with whites in
positions of leadership exerting authority over persons of color-reinforces racial
155. When referring to a "caste system," I adopt Cass Sunstein's understanding of such a system as "a
social status quo that, through historical and current practices, creates second-class status." Sunstein, supra
note 127, at 2436. See also Sullivan, supra note 4, at 96 (noting that employers "might adopt affirmative
action simply to eliminate from their operations all de facto embodiment of a system of racial caste").
156. 539 U.S. at 332.
157. Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural Justice and
Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 482, 482-83
(1995). Legitimacy in this context has also been described as "the dynamic relationship between the
entitlement of one party to exercise authority and the obligation of another party to obey." Timothy Casey,
When Good Intentions are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57
SMU L. REV. 1459, 1489 (2000) ("[L]egitimacy describes the authority of the [governmental entity] to make
binding decisions, and the extent to which people adhere to the decisions of the [entity] or recognize [it] as a
proper locus for decisional power.").
158. Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1720
(2005) (noting that "[legitimacy comes from the appearance (if not the reality) that positions of leadership are
open to different groups in society").
159. See Tyler & Degoey, supra note 157, at 483 (examining how authorities' actual or perceived
legitimacy influences group members' decisions when facing social dilemmas).
160. See Brief for General Motors, supra note 117, at 23-24 (warning that a fixed corporate hierarchy
dominated by whites may lead to racial divisiveness); BOWEN & BOK, supra note 53, at 12 (asserting that, in a
"healthy" society, challenging leadership and career opportunities are available to all races); Post, supra note
73, at 61 (positing that authorities' legitimacy may require actual racial diversity among their leaders).
161. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that
a racially diverse police force helps foster public support and confidence among a racially diverse community
that in turn enhances effective law enforcement).
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stereotypes along these lines. 162 As discussed above, an emerging body of behavioral
research reveals that common human cognitive functioning includes heavy reliance on
stereotypes as mental shortcuts to organize and thus make sense of the world around
us.163 Selecting leaders whose racial identity challenges these racial scripts destabilizes
those racial stereotypes, and thus may be a powerful antidote to unconscious bias held
by individuals of all races. 164
Unlike the race-matching justifications discussed above, this legitimacy-
enhancing rationale does not rely on race as a screen for some other quality. 165 A
diverse officer corps that works with and on behalf of the institution as a whole
represents a visible commitment to racial inclusion, rather than exclusion, for which
there is no more direct proxy. Legitimacy-enhancing rationales can and should thus be
distinguished from race-matching justifications: government has a compelling interest
in a racially diverse workplace that counters the dynamics of a perceived racial caste,
fostering its legitimacy and, ultimately, its success.
Government, on the other hand, does not have a compelling interest in reinforcing
racial separation and exclusion by matching officers with other officers or communities
of the same race. As Justice Stevens has observed:
The inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men are
created equal; the exclusionary decision is at war with that principle ...
[C]onsideration of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or
inclusionary plainly distinguishes ... valid purpose[s] in this case from a
race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality. 1
66
Race-based assignments of commanders to certain military units due to the racial
preferences, real or perceived, of its personnel remain unjustifiable because they
exclude individuals from certain duties or territories simply because of race-based
162. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 274 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that unconscious, as well as
conscious, bias sustains racial discrimination in society and impedes its correction).
163. See Armour, supra note 138 at 759-72 (urging explicit challenges to racial stereotypes and
discriminatory tendencies as an antidote to implicit bias).
164. See id. (promoting immediate and overt acknowledgment of racial stereotypes as a method of
combating them); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1279 (2002) (noting that awareness of "counterstereotypical exemplars" can erode the
power of racial stereotypes).
165. Prior to Grutter, Cynthia Estlund suggested a related but distinct argument, contending that
government may have a compelling interest in racially diverse workforces because such workplaces build
qualities and experiences-including "the cultivation of empathy and understanding and friendship, the
formation of social capital, and the promotion of communication among citizens across social cleavages"-
that are valuable to a thriving democracy. Estlund, supra note 122, at 84. This rationale similarly values racial
diversity in and of itself, rather than as a proxy for some other attribute, because of its value to all participants,
and society, of a diverse workforce:
The integration argument does not use race as a proxy; it does not turn on any assumption that
individuals necessarily exhibit cultural or other group differences or that those differences are
necessarily more important or more valuable to the organization than other differences in
background and experience. It turns on the sheer fact that group membership has been a source of
division and hostility.
Id. at 83.
166. Wygant, 476 U.S at 316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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assumptions about individual skills and roles.' 67 Indeed, assignments based on
African-Americans' actual or assumed preference for other African-Americans
encourage the same stereotypes as decisions catering to white troops' demands to be
led by white officers. Officers and personnel of different races must work with-and
learn to work with-each other.
168
D. Applying These Rationales for Racially Diverse Workforces to Other Contexts:
Law Enforcement
Courts may well seek to limit the legitimacy-enhancing rationale to contexts like
the military, which is of course a unique institution that tends to receive a great deal of
deference. 169 But perhaps this rationale need not be so cabined. 170 Might this approach
have any relevance for government employers outside the military?
In Petit v. City of Chicago,7' the Seventh Circuit found that it does.'72 After
discussing Grutter, including the Court's citation to the military experience, the panel
held that "there is an even more compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan
police force charged with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American
city like Chicago."' 173 The panel found that the city had adequately supported this
interest through expert studies and testimony that minorities were frequently distrustful
of predominantly white police forces and that the presence of minority sergeants
encourages community trust. 174 According to the Seventh Circuit, greater numbers of
minorities within the department build the public's perception of and willingness to
cooperate with it, which in turn enhances the department's ability to prevent and solve
crimes. 175 Indeed, the Kerner Commission reached a similar conclusion years earlier,
finding that mostly white police departments foster perceptions among minority
communities that they are "not being policed to maintain the civil peace but to maintain
the status quo."'
176
Even before Grutter, a number of courts acknowledged this interest with respect
167. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 553 F. Supp. 601, 611 (D. Conn. 1983) (noting that a
department's practice of matching officers by race to neighborhoods' racial composition is based on
impermissible stereotypes that African Americans work better with other African Americans).
168. See Estlund, supra note 122, at 79-83 (discussing government interest in integrated workplaces
where employees of different races learn from and with each other).
169. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (noting great deference due congressional
decisions regarding national security and military affairs and stressing courts' lack of competence in such
matters).
170. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting rationale's extension to other
contexts); Estlund, supra note 122, at 84-85 (noting that a similar rationale based on the government's interest
in the democratic benefits of integrated workplaces is potentially applicable to any employer).
171. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1111, 1114.
173. Id. at 1114.
174. Id. at 1115.
175. Id.
176. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDER, REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS, 165-66, 315 (1968); see also Lillard et al., supra note 16, at 140 ("If the people with guns
are all white and they tend to use them against minority populations, we have a real democratic legitimacy
problem or, at least in O'Connor's words, an appearance of a democratic legitimacy problem.").
2005]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
to law enforcement agencies' employment decisions. For example, in Wittmer v.
Peters,177 the Seventh Circuit upheld race-based hiring by a prison warden using a boot
camp approach to rehabilitating prisoners, "in which harsh regimentation, including
drill-sergeant abuse by correctional officers, is used to break down and remold the
character of the trainee." 17 8 The panel credited the testimony of experts in the field of
prison administration that "[t]he black lieutenant is needed because the black inmates
are believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and
brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the camp." 179  The
opinion did not explain why this might be so (nor did it question whether
"brutalization" is an effective strategy for rehabilitation), but the answer seems
apparent: an all-white officer corps "brutalizing" a predominantly black prison
population is all too "reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended."'
80
Similarly, in Talbert v. City of Richmond,18 1 the Fourth Circuit upheld the
Richmond Police Department's consideration of race as one factor among several in
promoting a black officer over the white plaintiff.182 Talbert powerfully demonstrates
how race may be properly included as one of several measures of merit in an
employment context. Both candidates met the department's minimum qualifications
for promotion, while the black officer had more relevant experience and the white
officer had a higher test score (although the black officer had the same or higher test
score than other white officers who had previously been promoted). 83 The police
department also concluded that "appointing for the first time a qualified black officer to
a top level policy-making position would benefit a city whose population was
approximately 50% black."' 184 Rather than imposing a quota or lowering standards, the
police department considered both candidates' full range of qualifications, including
race as one among several assessments of merit.'85 Grutter may add some support to
this trend.
While these decisions lend weight to the notion that law enforcement has a
compelling interest in enhancing its legitimacy through race-conscious leadership
selections, these cases do not support officers' race-based assignment to certain
neighborhoods based on residents' perceived or actual preference for officers of their
own race. 186 Given our nation's history of racial discrimination, minorities who have
experienced or observed poor treatment by whites in power may well prefer
interactions with authority figures of their own race. 187 But those understandable
177. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
178. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 917.
179. Id. at 920.
180. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981).
182. Talbert, 648 F.2d at 931-32.
183. Id. at 927-28.
184. Id. at 931-32.
185. See id. (noting that factors considered in decision to promote police officer included test scores and
prior experience, along with race).
186. See Bridgeport Guardians, 553 F. Supp. at 611 (rejecting police assignments matching officer with
neighborhood to be patrolled according to race).
187. See, e.g., Gerald P. Lopez, Keynote Address, Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORDHAM L.
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concerns can and should be accommodated without engaging in race-matched
assignments that only lock in exclusionary patterns. For example, as discussed above,
a racially diverse leadership corps can facilitate trust and cooperation by visibly
communicating a commitment to racial equality.' Moreover, emphasizing cross-
cultural competence-enhanced by education and training in a racially diverse
environment-as a measure of merit in hiring and promotion helps ensure that officers
of all races engage their responsibility to serve a diverse community effectively.
On the other hand, a legitimacy-fostering rationale would not support the
government's positive consideration of white racial status when hiring in a
predominantly white community. Such use of race does not further an asserted interest
in increased governmental legitimacy-and thus effectiveness-by eliminating
perceptions of a racial caste system, simply because no racial caste system has
historically denied whites access to positions of leadership.
18 9
E. Applying These Rationales for Racially Diverse Workforces to Other Contexts:
Health Care
Decisionmaking in the health care context raises particularly thorny challenges,
especially in light of the mounting evidence that "minority populations suffer greater
health problems than nomninorities," yet are much less likely to have access to quality
health care.19 What role, if any, should race-conscious decisionmaking involving
health care personnel play in addressing these crises?
First, because cross-cultural competence-defined as "the knowledge, skills,
REv. 2041, 2045-46 (2005) (describing his experiences with Los Angeles law enforcement as a young Latino
growing up in East Los Angeles); see also Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d
321, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that certain instrumental rationales for race-based decisionmaking by
police departments can be established by showing law enforcement's past discrimination against African
American citizens engendered hostility to the department that now undermines effective policing).
188. See, e.g., Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114-15 (reasoning that legitimacy-enhancing rationale supports pro-
diversity promotion policies in Chicago police department).
189. See Estlund, supra note 122, at 80 (positing in related context that the integration rationale "cannot
justify preferences that disfavor historically disadvantaged groups"); Hellman, supra note 134, at 361 (arguing
for an "anti-caste principle" in affirmative action decisions that would allow policies benefiting traditionally
disadvantaged groups); Sunstein, supra note 127, at 2433 (contending that a "castelike" system operates when
traditional modes of discrimination manifest in present social and legal structures). But see Sullivan, supra
note 4, at 98 (suggesting whites might have a claim for affirmative action when they themselves are victims of
racial subordination-"as it is especially clear they are not when white-dominated governments, unions, or
employers choose affirmative action").
190. Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges et al. as Amici Curia Supporting Respondents,
at 6, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398338 [hereinafter Brief of Amici
Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges]; see also Jordan J. Cohen et al., The Case for Diversity in
the Health Care Workforce, 21 HEALTH AFF. 90, 93 (2002) (contending that increased racial diversity among
medical practitioners would benefit heterogeneous American society); Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of
Black and Hispanic Physicians in Providing Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1305, 1307 (1996) (reporting that minority communities are more likely to suffer from shortage of
doctors); Shankar Vedantam, Racial Disparities Found in Pinpointing Mental Illness, WASH. POST, June 28,
2005, at Al (discussing a study revealing that "blacks in the United States were more than four times as likely
to be diagnosed" with schizophrenia as whites, even though schizophrenia affects all racial groups at the same
rate).
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attitudes, and behavior required of a practitioner to provide optimal health care services
to persons from a wide range of cultural backgrounds"191-is key to providing quality
health care, exposure to a racially diverse environment helps providers acquire such
competence.192 For this reason, medical schools have particularly strong grounds for
admitting a racially diverse student body.193 But because the process of attaining cross-
cultural competence does not end with a diploma, this interest extends beyond medical
schools to support employers' race-conscious decisionmaking to achieve the diversity
that contributes to a vibrant exchange of approaches to patient care.1
94
Thornier, in my view, is the contention that race-conscious hiring of health care
professionals is justified to accommodate the preferences of patients of color who feel
more comfortable with same-race doctors. 95 Proponents of this approach point to data
demonstrating that many minorities prefer, 196 and report more satisfactory interactions
with, 197 same-race doctors. Furthermore, studies indicate that patient satisfaction
correlates with positive health outcomes. 198
Again, these preferences may well be understandable for a variety of reasons,
including our government's legacy of discrimination. For example, one study found
that African-American men reported a reluctance to participate in clinical trials based
on their distrust of the government medical research establishment stemming from the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment. 199  Other studies have confirmed that significant
191. Cohen et al., supra note 190, at 92.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, supra note 190, at 14-
18 (arguing racially diverse medical school student bodies help develop more effective clinicians and offer
expanded perspectives for addressing health care management issues).
194. See id. (noting myriad benefits derived from diversity in medical profession); Cohen et al., supra
note 190, at 94 (contending diversity of perspectives fostered by racial diversity will also facilitate broadened
medical research agenda including attention to health care needs of minorities).
195. Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, supra note 190, at 12 (stating
that certain patients' satisfaction with treatment increases when doctor is of same race); Somnath Saha et al.,
Do Patients Choose Physicians of Their Own Race?, 19 HEALTH AFF. 76, 82 (2000) (suggesting medical
schools "may justify the consideration of race in admissions as a means toward providing the physician
workforce that health care consumers want").
196. See Frederick Chen et al., Patients' Beliefs About Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and
Satisfaction with Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 142 ("nearly one quarter of African Americans and one third of
Latinos preferred that their personal physician was of their same race or ethnicity"); Saha, et al., supra note
195, at 80 (concluding minority health care consumers disproportionately choose minority health care
providers).
197. See Chen et al., supra note 196, at 141-42 (reporting "association between patient preference, racial
concordance, and patient satisfaction"); LISA COOPER & NEIL POWE, DISPARITIES IN PATIENT EXPERIENCES,
HEALTH CARE PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES: THE ROLE OF PATIENT-PROVIDER RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND
LANGUAGE CONCORDANCE 4-8 (2004), available at http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publicationsshow
.htm?docid=231670 (reporting patients in race-concordant relationships generally reported higher levels of
satisfaction than patients in race-discordant relationships).
198. See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, supra note 190, at 12 (citing
research indicating patients who are more satisfied with their doctors are more likely to seek preventive care
and to follow necessary treatment); but see COOPER & POWE, supra note 197, at 10 (noting limited evidence
linking race-concordance with better health outcomes).
199. Nancy Stark et al., Increasing Participation of Minorities in Cancer Clinical Trials: Summary of
the 'Moving Beyond the Barriers' Conference in North Carolina, 94 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 31, 35 (2002).
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numbers of minority patients perceive racism in the health care setting.
2 0 0
These concerns are substantial, as lives are at stake. But addressing them by
indulging in race-matching threatens to revive the concept of customer preference as a
defense to job discrimination. Recall, for example, the Pennsylvania hospital that made
race-based job assignments in response to a white family's preference for same-race
health care personnel. 20  The same studies demonstrating that many patients of color
favor same-race doctors also found that significant numbers of minorities prefer not to
have doctors of their own race,20 2 perhaps reflecting ingrained racial stereotypes that
would only be reinforced by accommodating such preferences.
Fortunately, other solutions remain available if we look to the root of patient
concerns. First, emphasizing cross-cultural competence as a primary measure of merit
in hiring and promotion decisions directly addresses minority patients' concern, and
often their experience, that race-discordant doctors are not cross-culturally competent.
Rather than assume that race or national origin is a perfect proxy for the presence or
absence of such competence, we should directly value (and thus more accurately
measure) that essential skill set-and do so without relieving white doctors of their
responsibility to learn to serve all communities.20 3 Second, to the extent that minority
patients' dissatisfaction with white doctors stems from real or perceived discrimination,
the legitimacy-enhancing rationale would support race-conscious decisionmaking in
selecting a visibly diverse leadership team to communicate a commitment to racial
equality, thus assuaging concerns that disasters like Tuskegee will be repeated.
Because doctors are often seen as community leaders, if not heroes, such diversity also
helps explode stereotypes-held by patients of all races-about competence and
authority.
2°4
Also problematic is the argument that race-conscious hiring of health care
professionals is justified because doctors of color are more likely to choose to practice
in underserved communities. 20 5 Again, addressing the shortage of doctors serving
200. See Chen et al., supra note 196, at 140 (finding African Americans who preferred African
American doctors had especially strong beliefs about racial discrimination in health care); Rachel Johnson, et
al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Patient Perceptions of Bias and Cultural Competence in Health Care, 19
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 101, 106 (2004) (reporting minorities "are more likely to perceive bias and a lack of
cultural competence in the health system overall than are whites").
201, See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
202. Chen et al., supra note 196, at 140 (reporting thirteen percent of African Americans preferred a
non-African American physician and nineteen percent of Latinos preferred a non-Latino doctor).
203, See, e.g., Saha et al., supra note 195, at 81 (stating that in ideal circumstance, all medical
practitioners would possess cultural competency).
204. Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson remind us of the power of stereotypes in the medical field when they
recount the following riddle: "A father and his son are out driving. They are involved in an accident. The
father is killed, and the son is in critical condition. The son is rushed to the hospital and prepared for the
operation. The doctor comes in, sees the patient, and exclaims, 'I can't operate, it's my son!"' Chen &
Hanson, supra note 138, at 1113-14. As the authors note, this riddle proved impossible to solve for many
Americans in the 1970s (and perhaps thereafter), who were unable to imagine the possibility that the category
of"doctor" could include a woman (much less a mother). Id.
205. See Komaromy et al., supra note 190, at 1308-09 ("Black and Hispanic physicians locate their
practices in areas with higher proportions of residents from underserved minority groups. In addition, they
care for higher proportions of patients of their own race or ethnic group and patients who are uninsured or are
covered by Medicaid."); Ernest Moy & Barbara Bartman, Physician Race and Care of Minority and Medically
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communities of color is unquestionably imperative. But providers' commitment to
such communities can and should be assessed directly, rather than assuming that such
commitment perfectly correlates with race (although to be sure, screening for such a
commitment will likely result in a racially diverse workforce because providers of color
will often be able to articulate past endeavors or future plans that demonstrate their
interest in serving communities of color). To do otherwise again threatens to segregate
health care providers by race.
20 6
In sum, Grutter supports race-conscious decisionmaking to achieve several
compelling interests that would be advanced by a racially diverse health care
workforce: facilitating providers' training in cross-cultural competence by enabling
interactions among racially diverse colleagues, contributing to the exchange of diverse
perspectives and approaches to improve patient care, and enhancing institutional
legitimacy-and thus patient trust and satisfaction-by demonstrating a commitment to
racial equality through diverse leadership. These rationales for racial diversity,
however, can and should be parsed from race-matching strategies that may
inadvertently perpetuate racial stereotypes.
F. The Legitimacy-Enhancing Rationale: Some Limits
Courts may be reluctant to extend a legitimacy-enhancing rationale beyond
Grutter's higher education focus for fear that--once unleashed-forward-looking
justifications cannot be constrained. Indeed, this particular ground for racial diversity
may resonate most powerfully for government entities that depend on public trust and
investment for their legitimacy, and thus their effectiveness. For example, the
American Bar Association's amicus brief in Grutter suggested that such concerns
extend to the legal profession itself, maintaining that fewer minority lawyers in an
increasingly diverse nation "may foster a perception of illegitimacy of the legal
system." 207 The ABA urged the Court to guard against perceptions that "cast doubt on
the integrity of the judicial process," 20 8 noting that "public confidence in the courts
depends upon avoiding the perception of unfairness that results from lack of
participation. '20 9 To the extent that a particular governmental entity engages in limited
public contact or interaction, arguments that that entity's visible diversity enhances its
legitimacy-and thus its effectiveness-are considerably less persuasive.
This rationale's reach is also limited by attention to the evidentiary basis for the
claimed forward-looking benefits. The requisite factual predicate helps sort rationales
that challenge stereotypes from those that indulge them. Merely asserting, without
Indigent Patients, 273 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 1515 (1995) (reporting results of study concluding nonwhite
physicians are more likely to care for minority, medically indigent, and sicker patients).
206. Such assumptions may also create financial disadvantages for doctors of color steered or locked
into certain practices. See Moy & Bartman, supra note 205, at 1515 (noting that nonwhite physicians who
primarily treat less affluent patients may face capitation arrangements and other forms of financial penalty).
207. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241 ).
208. Id. at 14 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979)).
209. Id. at n.30; see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohmer, supra note 123, at 6-7, 28-29 (arguing that a
racially diverse judiciary is more likely to achieve judicial legitimacy in a heterogeneous society).
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evidence, that diversity is instrumentally valuable in a given context is thus
insufficient.
21°
As Judge Posner took care to note when writing for the Seventh Circuit in
Wittmer: "It is not enough to say that of course there should be some correspondence
between the racial composition of a prison's population and the racial composition of
the staff, common sense is not enough; common sense undergirded the pernicious
discrimination against blacks now universally regretted."'21 The panel thus required
expert testimony or other specific evidence supporting the instrumental link between
visible racial diversity in leadership and effective law enforcement. 21 2 Similarly, the
military leaders' brief in Grutter presented their specific experience from the 1960s and
1970s, rather than relying on speculation or even "common sense.
'213
Applying this requirement, the Seventh Circuit rejected instrumental justifications
for race-conscious promotions by the Chicago Fire Department absent evidence
supporting the city's contention that nondiverse firefighting teams would lack
credibility and be denied cooperation in minority neighborhoods: "Racial
discrimination cannot survive challenge without compelling evidence; even highly
plausible speculation will not do.
'2 14
Narrow tailoring's demanding requirements further restrain the reach of such
instrumental rationales. For example, including race as a measure of merit that
enhances a government employer's effectiveness should be part of an individualized
review, where each candidate is assessed as to his or her capacity to contribute to
effective policing (or whatever governmental function is at issue). An individual's
ability to contribute to leadership's racial diversity-with the attendant benefit of
increased legitimacy--can be included as a positive factor in assessing that individual's
qualifications for the job. Recall, for instance, Talbert v. City of Richmond,215 where
the city considered both candidates' full range of qualifications, including, but not
limited to, their ability to contribute to the department's racial diversity and thus its
effectiveness in serving a diverse community.
216
210. But note that generalized, rather than institution-specific, evidence should be sufficient when
demonstrating the instrumental benefits of racial diversity. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the factual predicate required to support instrumental justifications may be relaxed
compared to that required by the courts in remedial contexts.
211. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919 (7th Cir. 1996).
212. Id. For these reasons, the court distinguished the role model rationale for diversity due to its "lack
of substantiation and a well-nigh unlimited reach." Id. at 920.
213. See supra note 146 and accompanying text for a discussion of the specific experiences articulated
by military leaders; see also Comfort, 2005 WL 1404464, at *11 (relying on expert testimony on the
educational benefits of reducing students' racial isolation); Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114-15 (relying on testimony
linking racially diverse police departments to improved community trust and cooperation).
214. McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998).
215. 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981).
216. Talbert, 648 F.2d at 925. To be sure, questions remain about how other elements of narrow
tailoring might play out in this context. For example, consider the notion of critical mass. In educational
settings, critical mass refers to the number of students of color necessary to prevent students' racial isolation
and demonstrate the spectrum of diverse views held among students of color. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318-21.
The Grutter court was reluctant to press Michigan for a specific number; indeed, the Court seemed persuaded




As Grutter explained: "Not every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."2" 7  By
embracing an instrumental justification for government's race-based action, the
Supreme Court-for the first time in years--cracked open the door to race-conscious
decisionmaking.
But while Grutter offers support for a range of rationales for affirmative action,
the decision should not be understood as an invitation to race-conscious
decisionmaking that assumes that particular races have certain skills or proclivities or
that indulges discriminatory customer preferences. One of my objectives here is to
urge advocates, policymakers, and courts to sort carefully through the justifications
offered for government's race-based action. We should challenge ourselves to be clear
about what and who we value when making important decisions: are we attacking
stereotypes that perpetuate inequality or are we reinforcing them?
For many, the Supreme Court's reluctance to embrace moral rationales for
affirmative action is bewildering, if not maddening. Some of the Court's critics have
thus expressed concern that Grutter offers more of a symbolic rather than a practical
victory for advocates of racial justice. 21 8  But perhaps Grutter's acceptance of an
instrumental justification for race-conscious government decisionmaking also opens the
door to revisiting the moral roots of affirmative action. Grutter itself observes that
racial diversity can be valuable going forward precisely because race has made-and
continues to make-a difference: "Just as growing up in a particular region or having
particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is
one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters." 219  Indeed, as the military experience
illuminates, diversity can be instrumentally valuable because it is morally justifiable:
public entities' diverse leadership may be more effective because it visibly addresses
See id. at 318, 335-36 (stating that the admissions program's goal of achieving a critical mass was
distinguishable from use of a fixed quota). But what is the critical mass necessary to demonstrate that a
government employer's leadership is visibly open to all? See Estlund, supra note 122, at 88 (suggesting the
critical mass necessary to achieve benefits of racially integrated workforce is that number necessary to correct
"manifest imbalance" or "serious and persistent underrepresentation of minority groups"). Perhaps courts will
defer to the judgments of at least some government decisionmakers like the military and law enforcement, just
as the Grutter court deferred to the University's assessment of critical mass.
217. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
218. See Roithmayr, supra note 17, at 208-09; Spann, supra note 70, at 249 (arguing that recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence constrains affirmative action from remedying economic status quo or ongoing societal
discrimination).
219. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 333, 338 (2003) ("By virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality,
such students are both more likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's mission,
and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences."). See also Lee
C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM L. REv. 1589, 1591 (2003) ("A
primary reason why colleges and universities have embraced the educational policy of racial and ethnic
diversity-the reason why it works educationally-is that society has been and is still segregated, with all the
attendant perceptions and confusions that arise from that painful social condition.").
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the moral imperative of dismantling racial castes.22 0 In this way, attending to the past
allows us, finally, to move forward.
220. Cynthia Estlund also recognized a connection between forward-looking rationales and backwards-
looking justifications in her integration argument, explaining that:
The interest in integration is more closely related to, though still distinct from, the interest in
overcoming the effects of generalized past 'societal' discrimination, which the Court has rejected as
a seemingly limitless license for preferences. The arguments are related, first, because the
importance of workplace integration is based on the fact of widespread prejudice and de facto
segregation among racial and ethnic groups in the society; but the integration argument is forward-
looking and does not require us to sort out the admittedly complex causes of these social facts.
Estlund, supra note 122, at 80 (citations omitted).
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